A Book from a Divided China
The Art of War (Sunzi Bingfa, more literally translated
as Master Sun’s Rules for Soldiers) is Sun Tzu’s handbook of how to guarantee
victory in war. This is probably the oldest book on military theory, and one of
the most influential globally and historically. It’s certainly the most
widely-read. Any military library worth its salt will have at least one copy of
this book.
There’s some debate over when Sun Tzu actually wrote the
book – and if he ever existed at all. One ancient record places Sun Tzu in the
service of the King of Wu, a Chinese state, towards the end of the 6th
century BCE, during the Spring and Autumn period*. Sun Tzu describes well-organized
armies of a hundred thousand infantry and thousands of chariots, a class of
officers distinct from landed aristocracy, organized formations, and sieges of
walled cities – a level of organization considered by many scholars to be
inconsistent with that era, implying authorship during the later Warring States
period. It may have been written during the transition from one form of war to
another, or it may have been written by multiple authors in different periods. The
earliest known copy is from the 2nd century BCE, during the Han
dynasty, but the text was almost certainly written during either the Spring and
Autumn period or the Warring States period, when China had no single unified
state.
Context and Risk
“Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without
battle. They capture the enemy’s cities without assaulting them and overthrow
his state without protracted operations. Their aim is to take all under heaven
intact by strategic considerations.”
(Chapter 3).
The Art of War is
not a theoretical exposition of what war is, inherently and eternally; much of
its advice is associated with a specific context. Sun Tzu assumes that his
reader is, like him, a general directly serving an absolute monarch in a
fractured China. As a corollary to that, he believes that the intention of the reader
should be to reunite China under their sovereign’s rule.**
As a consequence of his context, Sun Tzu expects that enemy
troops, equipment, and territory can be easily incorporated into the reader’s
own army or state. He recommends taking enemy resources intact as an important
means of increasing your own strength. It’s hard to imagine implementing those
ideas outside similar contexts. For instance, it may be possible for
separatists in East Ukraine to use weapons or vehicles captured from the
Ukrainian military, since they’re using the same Soviet-era equipment, but it’s
hard to imagine Hamas effectively repurposing a captured Israeli tank that they
don’t have the training and ammunition to use or the spare parts to maintain.
The other consequence is risk aversion. Sun Tzu’s ideal war
is one that ends quickly and involves as little contact with the enemy as
possible. He explicitly advises his readers not to “press a desperate enemy too
hard” (Chapter 7) in efforts to exploit an advantage; he’d rather see a minor
but low-risk victory than gamble for a decisive one. This makes sense within
the context – if the state’s ultimate objective is to conquer all of China, and
many other states are seeking to do so, then playing the long game is essential.
Preservation of force takes a priority over short-term success.
The same applies to the state as a whole – Sun Tzu advocates
conducting operations deep in enemy territory, both to weaken the enemy by
feeding off of their resources and to minimize your own logistical and economic
burdens. So great is his emphasis on carrying the action into enemy territory
that he has a whole chapter on offensive strategy, but no chapter on the
defensive – which makes sense if he thinks of the defensive as a situation to
be avoided at all costs. The only times Sun Tzu really mentions defense is when
he suggests adopting a defensive position in enemy territory (that the enemy
will be forced to attack) and when he advocates withdrawing in the face of a
superior enemy force.
Information and Certainty
“Therefore, I say: Know the enemy and know thyself; in a
hundred battles, you will never be defeated.” (Chapter 3).
If Sun Tzu only had one word of advice to give, that word
would be “information”. If he had a second one, it would be “deception”. He
believes – or at least claims – that a commander with sufficient knowledge of
both his own situation and the enemy situation is invincible. This means that
being able to collect and interpret information is one of the most important
capabilities of a general.
The purpose of the entire first chapter is to ask seven
questions of the reader.
1.
“Which ruler is wise and more able?”
2.
“Which commander is more talented?”
3.
“Which army obtains the advantages of nature and
the terrain?”
4.
“In which army are regulations and instructions
better carried out?”
5.
“Which troops are stronger?”
6.
“Which army has the better-trained officers and
men?”
7.
“Which army administers rewards and punishments
in a more enlightened and correct way?”
Sun Tzu claims that victory and defeat can be predicted by
the answers to these seven questions. Of course, if information is so critical
that it can ensure victory, and wars must only be fought when victory is
ensured, then you’re going to have to do something to get that information. Sun
Tzu recognizes this. He spends an entire chapter talking about the proper use
of spies.
He also assumes that the enemy will use similar collection
and analysis of intelligence in efforts to bring about their own victory. This
leads to his famous statement that “all warfare is based on deception.” Sun Tzu
recommends throughout the text that generals be as inscrutable as possible and
conceal their intentions even from their subordinates.
Sun Tzu is not, however, the exclusive inventor of intelligence-based
warfare. The Arthashastra, written by
Kautilya, an Indian near-contemporary of Sun Tzu’s, goes to even greater
lengths in emphasizing and describing the collection and use of good
intelligence. If you appreciated Sun Tzu’s chapter on the Use of Spies, look up
the Arthashastra; it has much more in
that vein.
If, on the other hand, you share my concern that Sun Tzu is
overly optimistic about the predictability of war, it may be worth reading some
of Carl von Clausewitz’ book On War.
Clausewitz cautions against having too much faith in information, and asserts
the opposite claim to Sun Tzu – that the result of war is always uncertain, and
that inherently unpredictable factors can and often will be decisive.
Translations and Misconceptions
The numerous translations of this book were not created
equal. Several have interpretative annotations inserted into the text of the
book. Some of them even have obvious errors in translation. If you want to read
a good one, I recommend doing some research. The one I’ve used – and the source
of all my quotes – is Yuan Shibing’s 1987 translation, though there are several
other excellent translations out there.
Some of these translations appear to have led to
misinterpretations of the text. One of my gripes is the reading Sun Tzu’s use
of the word “tao” (“way”) to mean the Taoist concept of the underlying reality
of the universe. To me, this reading comes off as an orientalist understanding
of Sun Tzu as an infallible, mystical Eastern philosopher-warrior.
The thing is, Sun Tzu doesn’t use the word “tao” that way. In
my translation, he explicitly defines “tao” as the thing that makes people
obedient to their political leadership even at the risk of losing their own
lives. What he’s talking about isn’t the underlying reality of the universe; it’s
something along the lines of “social cohesion” or “governance.” He doesn’t ask
his reader to compare which ruler is more just and moral; he asks his reader to
compare which ruler is more in control of his state.
It’s worth remembering that while the years of Sun Tzu’s
life are unknown, he may have been a contemporary of Laozi (years also unknown),
the author of the Tao Te Ching and
the founder of Taoism – and he may even have lived before him. The chronology
is so ambiguous that it’s actually possible that The Art of War predates the Tao
Te Ching, and that any superficial similarities between them are the result
of common influences, not of one influencing the other.
Recommendations
If you have any interest in war, Chinese history, or war in
Chinese history, you should read this book. If you’re interested in anything
relating to tactics, strategy, or conflict – you could extend that to economics
and game theory, even – you should read this book. If you’re interested in
Chinese classics and philosophy, you should read this book. I may dispute the
links with Taoism, but if you’re interested in the philosophy, then I strongly
recommend that you read The Art of War
and form your own opinions. Join the debate.
I can’t say you shouldn’t read this book. Even if you’re
only tangentially interested in the subject matter, it’s a short, quick read,
and you can find translations of it online for free. The most I can say is that
you shouldn’t read it exclusively.
I have to emphasize again that your choice of translation is
going to make a difference in your experience of
The Art of War. You can read a decent comparison of some of the
translations
here.
That said,
The Art of War is short,
so you can probably read it in the time it would take you to make an educated
choice of translation.
I also want to point out that if English is not your native
language, there are still almost certainly translations in whatever your native
language is. It’s that widely read.
*The story involves the King of Wu asking Sun Tzu to demonstrate
his ability to lead troops with a group of concubines; Sun Tzu gains their
obedience by executing two of them.
**Sun Tzu uses the term “all under heaven” (tianxia) – which is in this context a
way of saying ‘the world’ where ‘the world’ means ‘China’.
All quotes are from Yuan Shibing’s 1987 translation of Sun
Tzu’s Art of War.
